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"VICTIMLESS CRIME" TAKES ON A NEW MEANING:
DID CALIFORNIA'S VICTIMS' RIGHTS AMENDMENT ELIMINATE
THE RIGHT TO BE RECOGNIZED AS A VICTIM?
Geoffrey Sant*
Introduction
In 2008, California voters passed Proposition 9, the Victim's Bill of Rights Act
of 2008 ("Marsy's Law" or the "Act"), thereby amending the California
Constitution.' Marsy's Law has been described as "significantly reform[ing]
California's criminal justice system."2 Opponents consider the amendment
"shocking." 3 Supporters see Marsy's Law as a possible model for victims' rights
amendments elsewhere, including a potential amendment to the U.S. Constitution.4
Yet to date there has been virtually no academic discussion of Marsy's Law.5 This
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Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Utah, for their helpful comments
on an earlier version of this article. This article builds on research initially conducted by the author on behalf
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rights through victim-centered advocacy, education, and resource sharing. NCVLI did not participate in the
creation of this article, and the opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author
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1. See DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL
ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sovcomplete.pdf (last
visited October 11, 2012). Proposition 9 passed with 53.9% in favor and 46.1% against. Id Some of the
arguments developed fully in this article were published in summary form by the author and Will Wade-Gery
in the Criminal Law Reporter on May 18, 2011. See Geoffrey Sant & Will Wade-Gery, Does the California
Victims'Rights Law Narrow the Rights of Crime Victims?, 89 CRIM. L. REP. 219 (May 18, 2011).
2. 2008 California Criminal Law Ballot Initiatives, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 173, 196 (2009).
3. Id. at 181-82 (citing Editorial, No on Proposition 9, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at 28).
4. See, e.g., About, MARSY'S LAW FOR ALL, http://www.marsyslawforall.org/about/ (last visited October
11, 2012) ("Dr. Henry T. Nicholas ... was the key backer and proponent of Marsy's Law. Dr. Nicholas is
now lending his support to an effort to amend victims' rights into the U.S. Constitution.").
5. See Sant & Wade-Gery, supra note 1 (presenting an abbreviated version of some of the arguments in
this article); 2008 California Criminal Law Ballot Initiative, supra note 2, at 176-90 (summarizing
Proposition 9 and discussing areas of particular impact or where the initiative's constitutionality may be in
dispute). Two other articles make note of Marsy's Law in passing during discussions of the California parole
system. See Steven Z. Perren, Indeterminate Sentencing Redux: A Return to Rational Sentencing, 22 FED.
SENT'G REP. 165, 168 (2010); Blaire Russell, Note, In re Lawrence and Hayward v. Marshall: Reexamining
the Due Process Protections of California Lifers Seeking Parole, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 251, 252, 255
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article aims to rectify this lack of attention, and focuses in particular upon one of
the most contentious aspects of this amendment: the definition of "victim."
The definition of "victim" within Marsy's Law, arguably the most fundamental
aspect of this constitutional amendment, has been criticized in passing in the
Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law as "somewhat ambiguous" such that it "may
therefore be difficult for courts to interpret." 6 The article foresaw litigation over the
definitional section of Marsy's law, but unfortunately it provided no detailed
analysis of the purported ambiguities, and did not even identify the allegedly
ambiguous terms.7  Meanwhile, at least one legal blogger has argued that the
definitional section of Marsy's Law created a "strange world" with perverse results,
including that "some crime victims are no longer crime victims."8  It has been
stated that this victims' rights law "[c]uriously . .. appears at first glance to narrow
the scope of victims' rights." 9
The remainder of this article provides the first in-depth academic analysis of
the definitions section of Marsy's Law. Based on the language of the text, the
purpose of the amendment, public policy, and parallel language in other victims'
rights laws, this article argues that the definition of "victim" is both clear and
without "perverse results." 10  Nevertheless, to avoid any potential ambiguity or
difficulties in interpretation, this article also provides model language to be used in
future victims' rights amendments.'I This proposed language accomplishes the
same purposes as the Marsy's Law definitions, while also avoiding any purported
ambiguities. 12
Overview of the Problem
Marsy's Law specifically states that "[t]he term 'victim' does not include a
person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom the court finds
would not act in the best interests of a minor victim."1 3 Based on a superficial
reading of this language, one might conclude that all individuals "in custody" are
excluded from "victim" status, and thus that "in custody" victims of sex trafficking
and child prostitution (to take two examples) are excluded from the protections of
Marsy's Law.14 Thus, for example, one legal blogger argued:
(2009).
6. 2008 California Criminal Law Ballot Initiative, supra note 2, at 179.
7. See id.
8. See Johnny California, Not All Crime Victims Created Equal: Another Constitutonal [sic] Problem
With Prop. 9, JOHNNY CALIFORNIA (Dec. 8, 2008), http://johnnycalifomia.com/2008/12/08/not-all-crime-
victims-created-equal-another-constitutonal-problem-with-prop-9/.
9. Sant & Wade-Gery, supra note 1, at 219.
10. See infra Parts I-V.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. Text of Proposed Laws, Proposition 9: Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008:Marsy's Law § 4.1, in
DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION
GUIDE 130 (2008), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf
(last visited October 11, 2012) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(e)) [hereinafter Marsy's Law].
14. See, e.g., California, supra note 8 (arguing that "[i]n the strange world of Prop. 9, some crime victims
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In the strange world of Prop 9 [i.e., Marsy's Law], some crime
victims are no longer crime victims....
... By not extending Prop 9 rights to "a person in custody for the
offense", [in the case of] someone who is assaulted or killed in jail
or prison, neither he nor his next of kin have Prop 9 rights [i.e.,
victims' rights]. And [w]hat happens if someone is a victim of
police brutality while in custody. . . ?1s
This seemingly straightforward reading of the definitional language in Marsy's Law
creates a perverse result: a victims' rights law that strips certain victims of their
legal rights - even their right to be recognized as victims.16
Further complicating the definition of "victim" within Marsy's Law is a recent
Supreme Court decision that expands the meaning of the term "in custody" to also
include certain instances in which a child is questioned by police.' 7 One may ask:
Is a child prostitute being questioned by police no longer a "victim" under
California law?
For purposes of making this discussion more concrete, this article will
primarily focus on child prostitutes as an example of individuals who may appear to
fall in the "in custody" exclusion and yet had been recognized under previous law
as "victims." Child prostitutes serve as a particularly compelling test case
considering that the Official Voter Information Guide's argument in favor of
Marsy's Law specifically cited (using all capital letters) the need to "level[] the
playing field" between "child molesters," who have certain guaranteed rights under
the California Constitution, and their "crime victims," who lacked any
corresponding "right to justice and due process."l 9  Particularly in light of this
language describing the intent and effects of the amendment, it would be a perverse
result indeed if the amendment actually stripped child sex victims of their status as
a "victim." Although this article focuses on child prostitutes as a test case, the
analysis developed below can be applied equally well to the other direct victims of
crime cited above as being purportedly excluded from receiving recognition (and
rights) as victims, including individuals assaulted in jail or prison, and individuals
who suffered police brutality while in custody.20
are no longer crime victims"); Sant & Wade-Gery, supra note 1, at 219 (noting that "Marsy's Law's definition
of 'victim' appears at first glance to narrow the scope of victims' rights").
15. California, supra note 8.
16. See id.
17. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (expanding the definition of "in custody"
when applied to juveniles). Note, however, that this case is likely limited to Miranda custody. See also
discussion infra Part I.B (analyzing the impact of this decision upon Marsy's Law).
18. See infra Part IV.A (citing cases that specifically identified child prostitutes as "victims," including,
People v. Brandon, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 445-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Roberson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 51,
55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
19. See BOWEN, supra note 13, at 62.
20. See infra Parts II.B, V.
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This article argues for a different interpretation of the Marsy's Law definition
of "victim" than the superficial analysis described above.21 In the author's view,
courts are reasonably likely to accept that child prostitutes, victims of sex
trafficking, in-custody victims of police brutality, and all other direct victims of
crime remain included within the category of "victim."22 This is because the best
interpretation of the exclusions is that they apply only to derivative victims of
crime, not to direct victims. 23 Specifically, in the case of child prostitutes, these
individuals would in almost all circumstances be direct, not derivative, victims of
crime, thereby rendering the exclusions inapplicable to them. 24
This interpretation is consistent with the prevailing federal definitions of
victim, which follow the same three-part framework: (i) direct victims; (ii) certain
derivative victims; and (iii) exclusions that apply to narrow the scope of derivative
victims.25 It is also consistent with the undisputed intent of Marsy's Law, namely,
to broaden the definition of "victim."26
In addition, Marsy's Law states that to the extent its provisions conflict with
prior law regarding victims' rights, the law providing the most expansive rights for
victims shall prevail.27 The definitional provision within Marsy's Law is arguably
a substantive right - the right to be recognized as a victim - and so should be read
to be as broad as the many state and federal laws that define child prostitutes as
"victims." 28
As discussed above, the Marsy's Law definition of "victim" is technically open
to a contrary interpretation, namely that the exclusions listed apply to direct and
derivative victims.29 Under this interpretation, a child prostitute "in custody for an
offense" would not be a crime victim under Marsy's Law even though she or he
otherwise qualifies as a direct victim of a crime such as trafficking. 30  This
interpretation would be inconsistent with prevailing statutory norms, would be
contrary to public policy, and would create the "strange world" and "perverse
results" discussed above, in which a victims' rights amendment has the effect of
stripping certain victims of their rights.31 Nevertheless, there cannot be complete
assurance that some courts would not follow this alternative view. For this reason,
the author has proposed slightly modified model language to be used in future
victims' rights amendments, thereby accomplishing the same purpose while
avoiding purported ambiguities. 32
21. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part H.
23. See infra Part H.C.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Parts II.D-E.
26. See infra Part III.
27. Marsy's Law § 7. See also discussion infra Part IV.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. See also Sant & Wade-Gery, supra note 1.
30. See Sant & Wade-Gery, supra note 1.
31. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part VI.
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Analysis
Marsy's Law defines a victim as follows:
[A] "victim" is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical,
psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or
attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act. The term
"victim" also includes the person's spouse, parents, children,
siblings, or guardian, and includes a lawful representative of a
crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or
psychologically incapacitated. The term "victim" does not include
a person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom
the court finds would not act in the best interests of a minor
victim.33
I. Even broadly construed, the exclusions stated in Marsy's Law will rarely
be applied to direct victims of crime.
The final sentence of the Marsy's Law definition of "victim" excludes "a
person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom the court finds
would not act in the best interests of a minor victim." 34 As noted in Part II below,
there is a strong argument that these exclusions apply only to the derivative victims
defined in the second sentence of the definition, and not to the direct victims
defined in the first sentence.35 However, even assuming that these exclusions apply
to direct victims as well, as a matter of law and practice, these exclusions are
unlikely to apply to many direct victim child prostitutes.36 Only the phrase "in
custody" has legal potential to include direct victims of crime.3 7 In order to make
the discussion more concrete, the following analysis focuses on child prostitutes as
a direct victim of crime who may nevertheless be "in custody."
A. A child prostitute is not "the accused" or "a person not acting in the
interests ofa minor victim."
The existence of a child prostitute presupposes an offense by an adult, whether
that is solicitation or sex trafficking. Accordingly, with respect to those adult
offenses, the child prostitute should not count as "the accused." This phrase
specifically uses the definite article, in contrast to the indefinite article used
elsewhere in the exclusion ("a person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a
person. . ."). 3 Unlike, for example, the phrase "a person in custody," which applies
33. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part H.
36. See infra Part I.A.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
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to any individual in custody for a crime, the phrase "the accused" only applies to
the specific individual(s) charged with that crime.39 The exclusion of "the accused"
does not exclude individuals who may be defendants in other actions or who may
later be charged with other crimes. 40  Accordingly, even child prostitutes under
threat of (and under actual) prosecution should not count as "the accused" for
purposes of the associated adult crime. Moreover, there is little argument that a
child prostitute can be identified as a person not acting in the interests of a minor
victim. Even if a child prostitute were deemed to be acting against their own
interests as a "minor victim," that would presuppose their "victim" status.41
B. The phrase "in custody for an offense" means currently serving a
sentence for a crime.
The only portion of the exclusion that may impact a child prostitute is the
exclusion of individuals "in custody for an offense." This is a very limited
exclusion. In the case of adults,42 the exclusion only applies to persons currently in
custody as a result of having been sentenced for a crime. 43  The language of the
third sentence is in the present tense: "[t]he term 'victim' does not include a person
in custody for an offense. . . ."44 Thus, the exclusion only applies to individuals
currently in custody.45 Moreover, the phrase "in custodyfor an offense" limits the
exclusion to individuals actually sentenced to custody for an offense. 46  Simply
39. Cf Shum v. Intel Corp., 629 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("In our view, the word Congress did
use, 'the,' is evidence that what follows . . . is specific and limited to a single party.") (citing Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasizing significance of definite article); Freytag
v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (emphasizing that definite article "the" narrows definition); Otis v.
Walter, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 192, 194 (1826) ("We consider the definite article as having been used for a
definite purpose . . . ."); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2368 (1981) (for definitions of
"custody" and "accused")).
40. Cf Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 434 ("The consistent use of the definite article . . . indicates that there is
generally only one proper [individual identified] . . . ."); Shum, 629 F.3d at 1367; Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
South, 125 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the significance of language that alternately uses the
definite article 'the' and the indefinite article 'an').
41. Cf Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2860 (2010)
(applying analogous logic: "[T]he CBA's arbitration clause ... pertains only to disputes 'arising under' the
CBA and thus presupposes the CBA's existence. . . .").
42. The Supreme Court has held that "in custody" has a special, broader meaning when applied to
juveniles. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 46 (emphasis added).
44. Marsy's Law § 4.1 (emphasis added).
45. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010) ("[T]he present tense generally does not
include the past."); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) ("Congress' use of a verb tense is
significant in construing statutes"); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 57 (1987) ("Congress could have phrased its requirement in language that looked to the past ... but it did
not choose this readily available option.").
46. Cf Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). In Maleng, the Supreme Court interpreted the
statute regulating habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which states "a district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . ." The Supreme Court
interpreted this language ("a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court") as requiring "that
the habeas petitioner be 'in custody' under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is
filed." Id. Thus, even under a broad reading of the exclusions in Marsy's Law, the fact that the exclusions are
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spending time in a detention facility awaiting bail or trial should be insufficient.4 7
Thus, the scope of the exclusion is relatively narrow.
In the case of underage individuals, however, the language "in custody for an
offense" may be affected by the Supreme Court's decision in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina.48 In JD.B., the Supreme Court held that "the age of a child subjected to
police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis" and that a 13-year-old may
be considered to be "in custody" when questioned at a school about a possible
crime.49 In the hypothetical case of a child victim of sex trafficking who is being
questioned about acts of prostitution, it might be argued that the police questioning
renders the child "in custody," and therefore not a "victim" due to the "in custody"
exception within Marsy's Law.50 (The most likely interpretation is that J.D.B.'s
definition of "in custody" will be limited to Miranda cases, however.)
The majority in JD.B. held that it was necessary to interpret the term "in
custody" broadly in the case of juveniles being questioned by police because
otherwise "some minors [would be] unprotected under Miranda in situations where
they perceive themselves to be confined."51 It would be a perverse result if the
Supreme Court's attempt to extend Miranda protections to "unprotected" juveniles
had the effect of excluding juvenile victims of crime from other protections,
namely, the protections of the Victim's Bill of Rights Act of 2008.
II. The exclusion clause is most reasonably interpreted to apply to derivative
not direct victims of crime.
Although there are at least two possible interpretations of the scope of the
exclusions within Marsy's Law, the most reasonable interpretation is to read the
exclusions narrowly, as applying only to derivative victims such as family
members. The alternative and broader interpretation is that the exclusions apply to
both derivative and direct victims of crime. Under the narrow interpretation, there
is no reason why child prostitutes should ever be excluded from the Marsy's Law
definition of "victim."
Under the broad interpretation, the exclusions qualify not only under the second
sentence of the definition, which describes derivative crime victims...
The term "victim" also includes the person's spouse, parents,
children, siblings, or guardian, and includes a lawful representative
of a crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or
formulated in the present tense limits their scope to individuals presently in custody "under the conviction or
sentence" at the time in which victimization occurred. Id.
47. See id. (requiring that the individual allegedly "in custody" be under a "conviction or sentence").
48. JD.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
49. Id. at 2398-99.
50. Even if such an argument succeeded, however, the child prostitute's exclusion from the category of
victim would only last for the length of the police interview, after which the child would once again be
included in the category of victims. See supra note 45.




... but also under the first sentence, which describes direct victims, as well:
[A] "victim" is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical,
psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or
attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act.53
Under this broad interpretation of the exclusions, therefore, direct victims of crime
are excluded from the definition of "victim" if they are "the accused," "in custody
for an offense" or deemed not to act in the best interests of a minor victim.54
Under the narrow interpretation, by contrast, the exclusions only qualify the
second sentence definition of derivative victims, and do not qualify the first
sentence definition of direct victims. 55  On this reading, the second sentence
expands the traditional definition of victims to include individuals closely
connected to a direct victim. The third sentence then establishes that certain
derivative victims (such as persons "in custody") are not to be considered
"victims." No direct victim of crime is excluded from recognition as a "victim."
In this author's assessment, the narrow interpretation is more reasonable for a
number of reasons: (1) Marsy's Law primarily expands protections for derivative
victims, not direct victims, so the new exclusion language should also be
understood to relate to derivative victims; (2) the contrary interpretation of the
exclusions leads to several absurd results; (3) the grammar and structure of the
exclusion better supports the narrow interpretation; (4) the broader interpretation of
the exclusions is in tension with the prevailing norms for federal and state
definitions of "victim," none of which apply any exclusions to direct victims of
crime; and (5) the structure of the definition of "victim" in Marsy's Law mirrors
federal statutes defining "victim," which limit exclusions to derivative victims
only.56
A. Marsy's Law was created, in part, to extend protections to derivative
victims, so the new exclusions are best read to apply to derivative
victims alone.
California traditionally distinguished between direct victims (who possessed
certain victims' rights), and derivative victims (who were excluded from those
57
rights). Under Marsy's Law, a carefully selected list of derivative victims now
52. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., California, supra note 8 (interpreting Marsy's Law in this way).
55. See infra Parts II.A-E.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 13955(a)(2) (West 2008) (defining "derivative victims" in terms of
their relationship to "victims"); People v. Giordano, 170 P.3d 623, 631 (Cal. 2007) (comparing direct victims
and derivative victims under the law).
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obtained full rights as "victims."5 It is reasonable to interpret the list of exclusions,
which appear immediately after the list of derivative victims, as acting to limit the
range of derivative victims who are to receive "victim" status under Marsy's Law.
Prior to Marsy's Law, California law distinguished between "direct victims"
and "derivative victims." 59 A "derivative victim" was generally defined as an
"individual who sustains pecuniary loss as a result of injury or death to a victim." 60
Traditionally, derivative victims had fewer rights at law than a direct victim.61
Marsy's Law defined "victim" to broaden the group of individuals
encompassed by victims' rights laws.62 It accomplished this, in part, by generally
eliminating the legal distinction between direct victims and derivative victims.
Thus, Marsy's Law carefully classified which derivative victims are now
recognized as victims, namely: "the person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, or
guardian" and other specific individuals.63 Because Marsy's Law changed the
treatment of derivative victims, it is reasonable to interpret the exclusions as being
part of this same change, and as merely limiting the scope of derivative victims
recognized as "victims."
B. The broad interpretation of the exclusions leads to absurd results. The
narrow interpretation does not.
If one interprets the exclusions as applying to direct victims, then the definition
of "victim" becomes absurd.64 This interpretation would create situations where
family members of a direct victim are "victims" even as the direct victim is
excluded from recognition as a "victim." 65  It would also exclude certain direct
victims from recognition as a "victim" if they were, for example, unable to act in
the best interests of an additional minor victim.66
Courts will not interpret language in a manner that leads to absurd results.67 As
noted, the third sentence of the definition states: "The term 'victim' does not
include a person in custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom the court
finds would not act in the best interests of a minor victim."68 The italicized portion
58. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
59. See supra note 57.
60. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 13955(a)(2).
61. See, e.g., Giordano, 170 P.3d at 631 (discussing the differing treatments of "direct victims" and
"derivative victims" under various statutes); People v. Birkett, 980 P.2d 912, 919-20 (Cal. 1999) (discussing
statutory schemes for "victim" restitution, and noting that courts had often excluded derivative victims from
such schemes).
62. See infra Part I.A.
63. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
64. See further discussion infra Parts II.C.D, III.
65. See further discussion infra Parts II.C.D, III.
66. See further discussion infra Parts II.C.D, III.
67. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510-511 (1989) (if the plain text would
induce an absurd result, the Court will interpret the law in a manner that reaches the most likely intended
result); Birkett, 980 P.2d at 915 ("We must follow the statute's plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so
would lead to absurd results.").
68. Marsy's Law § 4.1 (emphasis added).
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only makes sense when it is interpreted as modifying the second sentence
(derivative victims), and leads to absurdity when it is interpreted as modifying the
first sentence (direct victims).
If the third sentence modifies the first sentence, then the definition of "victim"
would exclude persons who suffered direct harm and who are for some reason
unable to act in the best interests of a minor victim. Consider the following
scenario: A court has decided that a medically incapacitated mother is incapable of
acting in the best interests of her daughter. If the mother and daughter are joint
victims of a violent assault, the mother would be excluded from the class of "direct
victims" simply because she is "a person whom the court finds would not act in the
best interests of a minor victim." 69
A "person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a minor
victim" was presumably meant to refer to a guardian or some other derivative
victim, such as a parent. And, in fact, the second sentence lists "parents," a
"guardian," and "a lawful representative of a crime victim" among the derivative
victims now included in the definition of "victim." 70 Hence, the third sentence
should be understood only to modify the second sentence.
Other absurd results appear if the third sentence is interpreted as modifying the
first sentence. Consider the following hypothetical: a minor is a victim of sexual
assault. The assault victim subsequently commits an unrelated offense leading to
custody. With respect to the assault, this direct victim would no longer count as a
"victim." However, her legal representative would count as a "victim" because the
second sentence of the definition includes the legal representative of a minor.71 On
its face, it appears absurd to read a victims' rights amendment to grant "victim"
status to representatives of a child victim while denying that status to the child
victim herself.
Likewise, it would be absurd if family members of a direct victim had the right
to participate in proceedings, while the actual direct victim was barred from
participation. Consider the following situation: a prisoner is assaulted in custody.
If the "in custody" exclusion applies to direct victims of crime, then the prisoner
would have no guaranteed right to attend proceedings related to the assault or to
give information to an official "concerning the impact of the offense on the victim"
even though his or her siblings and other family members would have the absolute
right to attend those same proceedings and to provide information "concerning the




72. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(10). See also California, supra note 8 (raising a similar scenario and
describing it as a "strange world" and "nothing rational").
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C. The grammar and structure of the definition support the narrow
interpretation of the exclusions.
1. The verbs used in the provision provide further evidence that
the third sentence is intended to restrict the class of derivative
victims only.
Although each of the three sentences serves to define the term "victim," the
first sentence uses a different verb from the final two sentences.73 In contrast, the
second and third sentences use the same verb and a parallel structure. 74 This further
supports the notion that the third sentence's exclusions only apply to the second
sentence of the definition.
It is a general rule of the English language that the same verb may be repeated
when referring to a series of similar concepts, but that differing verbs are used when
dealing with a sequence of different concepts. Justice Breyer has commented upon
this rule as follows: "That is why we cannot, without comic effect, yoke radically
different nouns to a single verb, e.g., 'He caught three salmon, two trout, and a
cold."75
The first sentence, defining a direct victim, uses the verb "to be," thereby
equating the term "victim" with those directly impacted by crime ("[a] 'victim' is a
person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial
harm"). 76 On the other hand, the second and third sentences use the verb "include,"
thereby expressing that the traditional meaning of "victim" is being expanded to
encompass certain derivative victims as well: "The term 'victim' also includes....
and includes.... The term 'victim' does not include. . . ."77
2. The phrase "a person in custody for an offense" appears
within a series of other exceptions which apply only to
derivative victims.
When a word with an ambiguous scope of meaning appears within a list, courts
will look to the scope of the other words on the list in order to interpret the scope of
the ambiguous word. In this case, the phrase "a person in custody for an offense"
appears at the beginning of a list. Each of the other terms on the list ("the accused"
and "a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a minor
victim") can only refer to derivative victims. 79 For this reason, a court should
conclude that the phrase "a person in custody for an offense" likewise applies to
derivative victims only.
73. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
74. Id.
75. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 245 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Marsy's Law § 4.1 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See discussion infra Part IID.
79. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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When interpreting the scope of a word or phrase, courts look for guidance to
the surrounding context. The "meaning of a word, and, consequently, the intention
of the legislature," should be "ascertained by reference to the context, and by
considering whether the word in question and the surrounding words
are. . .referable to the same subject-matter."so According to the principle of
noscitur a sociis, words in a series should be interpreted in relation to one another.81
The Supreme Court has called noscitur a sociis "an interpretive rule as familiar
outside the law as it is within, for words and people are known by their
companions."82 Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has commented that, "[t]he maxim
noscitur a sociis, . . while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a
word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended
breadth to the Acts of Congress." 83
In Gutierrez v. Ada, the Supreme Court had to interpret the breadth of the
phrase "any election." 84  Despite the seemingly broad scope of the words "any
election," the Court limited the scope of these words to gubernatorial elections
because the statute within which these words appeared contained many references
to gubernatorial elections, and none to other elections. The Court interpreted the
words "any election" in accordance with the surrounding language so as to avoid
giving this phrase a far broader scope than intended.86
Here, a court should apply the principle of noscitur a sociis and understand the
phrase "a person in custody" to be limited to derivative victims so as to avoid
giving the exception an "unintended breadth."87  Much like the example of the
phrase "any election" discussed by the Supreme Court in Gutierrez, the phrase "a
person in custody" seems at first glance to have a potentially broad scope. Just as
the phrase "any election" in Gutierrez was surrounded by references to
gubernatorial elections, the phrase "a person in custody" appears first in a list of
exceptions - "the accused" and "a person whom the court finds would not act in the
best interests of a minor victim" - which can only apply to derivative victims of
crime.
It is axiomatic that the perpetrator of a crime ("the accused") is not a victim of
the crime committed.89 And, as noted above, it would be absurd to exclude a direct
victim on the basis that the direct victim is incapable of acting in the best interests
80. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878).
81. See, e.g., Washington State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537
U.S. 371, 384 (2003) (stating that words are "known by their companions"); Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250,
255 (2000) (same language).
82. Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 255.
83. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
84. Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 254-255.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Compare Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 254-255, with Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307 (describing the principle of
noscitur a sociis as having the purpose of avoiding "unintended breadth").
88. Compare Marsy's Law § 4.1, with Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 255.
89. Cf People v. Tackett, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting defendant's "new and
novel theory" that he should be considered the victim of a drunk driving offense).
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of an additional minor victim.90 It would be equally absurd to find that a direct
"minor victim" is to be excluded from the category of "victims" because she was
unable to act in her own best interests.
Therefore, the phrase "a person in custody" should, like the other exceptions,
be interpreted as applying to derivative victims only. This is because, in construing
a provision of law, courts "must, to the extent possible, ensure that the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent."
D. Federal and state statutes defining "victim " exclude certain
individuals from the category of derivative victims recognized as
"victims" but never exclude anyone from the category of direct
victims.
Another technique for interpreting ambiguous language is to look at parallel
statutes which have the same purpose but which have been framed in a slightly
different manner. 92  These parallel authorities can provide insight into the
interpretation of a word or phrase. In this case, many federal victims' rights statutes
exclude certain individuals from the category of derivative victims recognized as
"victims." 93 However, no federal or California statute excludes anybody from the
category of direct victims recognized as "victims."94 For this reason, a court should
conclude that the exclusions within Marsy's Law were also intended to apply to
derivative victims only.
1. Federal statutes
Federal statutes define "victim" in a two-step process: first, a "victim" is "a
person directly and proximately harmed," 95 second, some derivative victims (e.g.,
certain legal guardians and other representatives) are also included within the
"victim" category,96 "but in no event shall the defendant be named as such
representative or guardian." 97 Thus, the Crime Victims' Rights Act, the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, and the Victim and Witness Protection Act each
defined the "victim" as a person directly and proximately harmed, and each exclude
90. See discussion supra Part II.B.
91. Ali, 552 U.S. at 222.
92. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (interpreting statutes by looking to parallel
language in previous statutes).
93. See infra Part II.D.i.
94. See infra Part II.D.1-2.
95. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2006); Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(2) (2006); Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston,
Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2006).
96. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 § 3663(a)(2); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
§ 3663A(2); Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'
Rights Act § 3771(e).
97. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 § 3663(a)(2); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
§ 3663A(2); Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'
Rights Act § 3771(e).
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"the defendant" from being named as the guardian or representative.9 8 As can be
seen, the definitions in these federal statutes exclude "the defendant" solely from
the class of derivative victims (i.e., legal guardians and representatives) potentially
recognized as "victims." These federal statutes do not specifically exclude "the
defendant" or "the accused" from the class of direct victims recognized as "victims"
because doing so would be both unnecessary and absurd.99
2. California
Prior to Marsy's Law, California statutes defining victim limited the definition
to direct victims of crime.100 Apparently because these statutes did not recognize
any derivative victims within the definition of "victim," there was no need to
specifically exclude "the accused" from this definition. For example, California
Penal Code Section 679.01 defines "victim" as "a person against whom a crime has
been committed." 01 This definition limits the term "victim" to direct victims only
and contains no exclusion for "the defendant" or "the accused."l 02 California Penal
Code Section 136(3) also defines "victim" in such a way that restricts the category
to direct victims only, and likewise contains no exclusions for "the accused" or "the
defendant."lo3 Other California statutes that define "victim" do so in such a way as
to exclude all derivative victims, and thus apparently had no need to exclude "the
accused" or "the defendant." 04
Thus, California statutes recognized that all direct victims of crime were
"victims." It is reasonable to conclude that Marsy's Law also recognized all direct
victims as "victims."
E. The definitional structure of Marsy's Law mirrors that contained in
various federal statutes.
Federal and California statutes can be used to interpret the overall structure of
the definition of "victim" within Marsy's Law. os Specifically, Marsy's Law
98. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 § 3663(a)(2); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
§ 3663A(2); Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'
Rights Act § 377 1(e).
99. For a discussion of "absurd," see supra Part I.B.
100. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 679.01 (West 2008) ("victim" is defined as "a person against whom a
crime has been committed"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 136(3) (West 2008) (definition of "victim" does not include
derivative victims and contains no exclusions); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13951(g) (West 2008) (definition of
"victim" contains no derivative victims and no exclusions).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.01.
102. See id.
103. CAL.PENAL CODE § 136(3).
104. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13951(g).
105. This is a similar but distinct argument from that discussed in Part II.D. See supra Part I.D. Part 11.D
states that the exclusions in Marsy's Law likely apply only to derivative victims because in federal and state
statutes, exclusions apply only to derivative victims and not to direct victims of crime. Part II.E states that
Marsy's Law can be interpreted as having a similar structure to federal statutes, which first state that all direct
victims are recognized as "victims," then add that certain derivative victims are also recognized as victims,
56 [Vol. 39:1
"Victimless Crime" Takes on a New Meaning
closely resembles many federal statutes containing a three-part definition of victim:
(1) direct victims are "victims"; (2) certain derivative victims are included in the
definition of "victim"; and (3) certain other derivative victims are excluded from
the definition of "victim."1 06  Because Marsy's Law appears to share this same
structure, it is reasonable to conclude that the exceptions in the third sentence of
Marsy's Law were intended to apply to derivative victims only.
When a court construes a statute, it is "informed by interpretations of parallel
definitions in previous statutes.',1o Marsy's Law was a referendum placed directly
on the ballot, and so lacks a legislative history. 0 8 However, it appears to have been
modeled upon federal victims' rights laws, all of which share the three-part
structure identified above.
Thus, the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA") establishes the following
definition of "victim":
For the purposes of this chapter [this section], the term "crime
victim" means a person directly and proximately harmed as a
result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the
District of Columbia. In the case of a crime victim who is under
18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal
guardians of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime
victim's estate, family members, or any other persons appointed as
suitable by the court, may assume the crime victim's rights under
this chapter [this section], but in no event shall the defendant be
named as such guardian or representative.109
As can be seen, the CVRA first recognizes direct victims ("a person directly and
proximately harmed") as "victims." Then, the CVRA expands the definition of
"victim" to include certain derivative victims ("legal guardians"; "family
members"; "other persons appointed as suitable by the court"). Lastly, the CVRA
excludes certain individuals from the list of derivative victims who are recognized
as "victims" ("in no event shall the defendant be named as such guardian"). The
CVRA's definition of "victim" exactly copies the definition appearing in other
federal statutes. 1o Each of these statutes follows the same three-step process.
and finally list certain individuals who are excluded from the category of "victims" even if they would
otherwise fall into the category of derivative victims. See supra Part II.D.3. Thus, Part II.D is an argument
based on the purpose of Marsy's Law (discernible through a comparison with similar statutes), and Part II.E is
an argument based on the structure of Marsy's Law (also discernible through a comparison with similar
statutes).
106. See, e.g., Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime
Victims' Rights Act § 3771(e); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 § 3663A(a)(2); Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982 § 3663(a)(2).
107. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
108. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
109. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'
Rights Act § 3771(e).




To the extent that Marsy's Law departed from these prior statutes, it did so by
greatly expanding the class of derivative victims recognized as "victims." Federal
law limited derivative "victim" status to certain selected representatives of
underage, incompetent, incapacitated, and deceased victims.112 In contrast,
Marsy's Law added a long list of family members of direct victims to the category
of recognized "victims." 1l3 In order to maintain the exclusion for defendants and
other bad actors, Marsy's Law changed the language of the CVRA and the other
federal statutes from "in no event shall the defendant be named as such guardian" to
a broader exclusion of such individuals generally (thus excluding "a person in
custody for an offense, the accused, or a person whom the court finds would not act
in the best interests of a minor victim"). 114 Moreover, because Marsy's Law
expanded both the class of derivative victims recognized as "victims" under the
law, and also expanded the corresponding exclusion of certain individuals from that
group, it was necessary to break what had originally been a single sentence in the
federal statutes into two separate sentences.115 Faced with a similar situation, the
Supreme Court concluded that "the most apparent effect of the amendment was to
divide what was once a lengthy principal sentence into separate subparagraphs."ll 6
Marsy's Law changed what had originally been a subordinate clause into an
independent sentence. Nevertheless, it appears to have the same basic structure and
scheme as other victims' rights laws, all of which exclude defendants and bad
actors solely from the class of derivative victims recognized by law as "victims."
F. The narrow interpretation of the exclusions is most consistent with the
intent of the amendment.
There is no dispute that Marsy's Law was intended to expand the definition of
"victim" and to provide victims and their families with greater access to the justice
system.117 If there is any ambiguity as to the meaning of the plain text of Marsy's
Law, the court should look to the amendment's intent for guidance. 118 Because the
undisputed intent of Marsy's Law was to expand access to the justice system, the
111. See id.
112. Id.; Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims'
Rights Act § 3771(e).
113. Marsy's Law § 4.1.
114. Id.
115. Compare Marsy's Law § 4.1, with United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010) (affirming
a First Circuit decision which interpreted a new version of a statute as merely "break[ing] what was a single
run-on sentence into subparagraphs" for stylistic reasons).
116. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2176.
117. See 2008 Cahfornia Criminal Law Ballot Initiatives, supra note 2, at 179, 196 ("It is apparent that
Proposition 9's drafters intended its protections to cover a group well beyond a narrow category of 'technical'
victims of realized crimes."). See also infra Part III.A.
118. People v. Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Cal. 1993) (declaring that the language of statutory
provisions enacted in response to the 1982 version of Marsy's Law must be "interpreted reasonably in light of
[Marsy's Law's] evident purpose"). See also Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)
("Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose
and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.") (emphasis
added).
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court should interpret the language of the definition in that light, and accordingly
conclude that the exclusions apply only to derivative victims and not to the direct
victims of crime.
G. The purpose of Marsy's Law was to expand victims' rights and
broaden the definition of "victim."
All available sources indicate that the intent of Marsy's Law was to expand
victim's rights. These sources are reviewed below.
1. Interpretations of intent with respect to earlier amendments
In 1995, the California appellate courts considered the 1982 version of Marsy's
Law, and concluded that any interpretation which had the effect of limiting victim's
rights "would be in derogation of the expressed intent and purposes" of the 1982
victim's rights amendment which originally established those rights.119
2. Other indicia of intent
According to the California appellate courts, "When an initiative measure's
language is ambiguous, we refer to other indicia of the voters' intent, particularly
the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet."1 20
An examination of the contemporary arguments demonstrates unequivocally
that the 2008 Marsy's Law amendment was intended to expand access to the justice
system for both direct and derivative crime victims. 121 The Office of the Attorney
General of California officially describes the purpose and intent of Marsy's Law to
be "[p]rovid[ing] victims with rights to justice and due process."1 22
Opponents of Marsy's Law agreed that the amendment would expand access to
the justice system to additional individuals: "It makes changes to the rights of
victims of crime, primarily by requiring some additional notice of and participation
in legal proceedings, and places these changes in the state Constitution."l 23
Likewise, an editorial in the L.A. Times opposing the amendment stated, "[i]f the
concern is protection of families from further victimization, as proponents claim,
that goal can be met without granting families a new and inappropriate role in
119. People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1995).
120. Birkett, 980 P.2d at 915 (interpreting the 1982 version of Marsy's Law by examining arguments
made by proponents and opponents of the measure, including arguments on the ballot pamphlet). See also
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.2d 48, 52 (Cal. 2009) (looking to the ballot arguments to determine the intent of a
California constitutional amendment).
121. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 62 (2008) (derivative victims who felt shut out of the justice system
describing these experiences). See also supra notes 118-120.
122. State of California Department of Justice - Office of the Attorney General, "Statement of Purpose
and Intent," available at http://oag.ca.gov/victimservices/content/statement (last visited on Nov. 29, 2012).
123. See "No ON PROP 9: QUESTION AND ANSWER," available at




In addition, because federal victims' rights legislation provided victims with
expanded rights and access to court hearings, it is reasonable to assume that
California's victims' rights amendment was intended to produce the same result. 125
Other statutes and policies both domestically and internationally reflect an ongoing
expansion of victims' rights to participate within the criminal justice process.126 As
one example, the European Union's Framework Decision on the standing of crime
victims insists that crime victims play "a real and appropriate role" in European
criminal trials.127 It would be anomalous for a victims' rights amendment, such as
Marsy's Law, to act in contradiction of this global trend.128
3. Textual indicia of intent
The text of the Marsy's Law amendment shows that it was created with the
intention of expanding access to the justice system to derivative victims of crime.
The amendment states: "The statutory provisions of this Act shall not be amended
by the Legislature [except by three-fourths vote or by a statute approved by the
voters]. However, the Legislature may amend the statutory provisions of this Act to
expand the scope of their application, to recognize additional rights of victims of
crime, or to further the rights of victims of crime by a statute passed by a majority
vote of the membership of each house."l 29
Likewise, the amendment's opening declaration states that crime victims have
"the right to notice and to be heard during critical stages of the justice system." 30
The amendment states that "the 'Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law'
is needed to remedy a justice system that fails to fully recognize and adequately
enforce the rights of victims of crime."l31 ,Marsy's Law is written on behalf of
[murder victim Marsy's] mother, father, and brother, who were often treated as
though they had no rights."l32 As the quoted language demonstrates, Marsy's Law
had the purpose of expanding access to the justice system both on behalf of the
direct victim and also on behalf of derivative victims (such as the "mother, father,
and brother"), so as to "fully recognize" rights that were not recognized previously
("as though they had no rights").133
The 2008 amendment specifically revised many provisions of California law in
124. Editorial, No on Proposition 9, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at 28.
125. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 611, 616 (2009);
see also Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim's Right to Attend the Trial. The Reascendant
National Consensus, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 481 (2005) (the current trend is to permit greater participation
in court hearings by crime victims through participation, including allocution).
126. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
127. 2001 O.J. L 82/2 JHA.
128. See, e.g., Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements, 33 Austl. Inst. Criminology, (1991) (Austl.) (noting
that "[als the process has continued, concern for victims' rights expanded into areas beyond its initial focus").
129. Marsy's Law, § 9 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at § 2(l).
131. Id. at § 2(2).
132. Id.
133. Id at § 2(l)-(2).
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order to expand access to the justice system. For example, the amendment expands
access to parole hearings, from "[t]he victim, next of kin, two members of the
immediate family, or two representatives" to "[t]he victim, next of kin, members of
the victim's family, and two representatives." 134 This change allows an unlimited
number of family members of the victim to attend the parole hearing, removes the
former limitation of "immediate family," and allows two representatives to attend in
addition to the victim and family members. The 2008 amendment specifically
states that "the [parole] board shall allow. .spouse, children, parents, siblings,
grandchildren, and grandparents [of victims to attend parole hearings]."135
H. Given the stated purpose of the amendment, the exclusions should be
understood to limit only derivative victim protections.
Given the stated intent of Marsy's Law, it would be hypertechnical to interpret
the definitional exclusions to apply to direct victims as well as derivative victims.
It is well established in California that courts must not subvert the intent of a
constitutional amendment through excessively technical interpretations of the
amendment's language: "[A] constitution is ... not to be interpreted according to
narrow or supertechnical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, so that
it may accomplish in full measure the objects of its establishment." 36
There is no reason to believe that Marsy's Law "constituted a retrenchment
from then-existing rights, rather than the expansion that [was] so obviously
envisioned." 137
III. Marsy's Law has a conflicts provision that arguably supports the narrow
interpretation of the exclusions.
Marsy's Law states that, in case of a conflict of law between Marsy's Law and
other laws that provide rights to victims of crime, the law that provides greater
rights shall prevail.
IV. Conflicts with existing law
It is the intent of the People of the State of California in enacting this Act that if
any provision in this Act conflicts with an existing provision of law which provides
for greater rights of victims of crime, the latter provision shall apply.138
Arguably, one of the rights, which Marsy's Law provides to victims of crime, is
the right to be recognized as such. Thus, Marsy's Law expands the universe of
134. Cal. Pen. Code 8.1 § 3043(b)(1) (West 2012).
135. Cal. Pen. Code 8.1 § 3043(e) (West 2012).
136. People v. Giordano, 42 Cal. 4th 644, 655 (2007) (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist.
v. State Bd. Of Equalization 22 Cal. 3d 208, 244-245 (1978) and quoting Stephens v. Chambers, 34 Cal. App.
660, 663-664 (1917)).
137. United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (D. Utah 2005).
138. Marsy's Law § 7.
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victims permitted to testify at parole hearings to "any person harmed by the
offender"139 and states that "the term 'victim' also includes the person's spouse,
parents, children, siblings," and others.140 To the extent that Marsy's Law provides
a more restrictive interpretation of "victim" than earlier victims' rights laws, there
is a reasonable argument that the conflicts of laws provision should broaden the
scope of the Marsy's Law definition of victim.
Before Marsy's Law, California defined "victim" so as to encompass child
victims of prostitution. In fact, numerous federal and California statutes explicitly
state that child victims of prostitution are "victims," and both federal and California
case law is to the same effect.141 In addition, neither federal nor state law
definitions of "victim" in existence prior to Marsy's Law carved out any exceptions
for direct victims of crime who are "in custody." 42  Therefore, even if one
interprets the Marsy's Law definition of "victim" as excluding direct victims who
are "in custody," this definition does not supplant the broader preexisting definition
of "victim" that includes all direct victims of crime. Victims each have a
substantive right to be recognized as a "victim," and Marsy's Law does not abridge
this right.
While the foregoing is an arguable interpretation of the conflicts of laws
provision of Marsy's Law, it should be noted that there are two potential
weaknesses to this argument. First, it is not clear that the right to be recognized as a
"victim" is indeed a substantive right. Second, it is not clear if the conflicts of laws
provision actually requires that the definition of "victim" within Marsy's Law to be
expanded so as to encompass all who would have been recognized as victims under
former law. It could be read solely to require that individuals who would have been
granted rights as "victims" under former laws continue to receive those rights, but
that they do not also receive the rights granted under Marsy's Law.
A. Caifornia law
Before Marsy's Law, California defined a "victim" as "any person alleged or
found, upon the record, to have sustained physical or financial injury... as a direct
result of the crime charged." 43 This definition of victim does not exclude
individuals in custody. Because a child victim of prostitution is the object of the
crime of sex trafficking, a child prostitute would be recognized as a "victim" under
former California law and would arguably continue to be recognized as a "victim"
under the conflict of laws provision of Marsy's Law.
California case law consistently described child victims of prostitution as
139. Id. at§4(d).
140. Id. at § 4(e).
141. See infra Section IV.A-B.
142. Id.
143. Cal. Pen. Code § 11158 (2008); see also People v. Tackett, 144 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 445, 454 (Cal.
App. 3d Dist. 2006) ("The basic notion of a victim of a crime is the person who was the object of the crime -
the person against whom the crime was committed.").
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"victims."1 44 California appellate courts have referred to current and former child
prostitutes as "victims," and compared them to victims of other crimes.145 Thus,
for instance, one appellate court stated that "many of the victims in this case were
much like the victims of child abuse, rape, and domestic violence.. .The testimony
of each victim served to corroborate the experience related by all of the victims."1 46
Likewise, a California appellate court repeatedly described a fourteen-year-old
prostitute as a "victim": "the victim's acts of prostitution. . .the victim's
testimony.. .the victim submitted. . ."4 7
B. Federal law
Federal statutes and federal case law consistently recognize child victims of
prostitution as "victims." Thus, the Crime Victims' Rights Act establishes that all
direct victims are "victims."l48 Direct victims who are in custody are not excluded
from this definition. 149  Courts considering the Crime Victims' Rights Act have
explicitly labeled child victims of prostitution as "victims." 50
Other federal statutes are even more explicit in declaring that child victims of
prostitution are to be considered victims. Thus, the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act uses the word "Victims" in its title, and states that its purpose is to "combat
trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of
traffickers, and to protect their victims."151  The statute further states: "[V]ictims
are often forced through physical violence to engage in sex acts . . .. Such force
includes rape and other forms of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, imprisonment,
threats, psychological abuse, and coercion."1 52  "Victims of severe forms of
trafficking should not be inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized
solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked . . . ."153
Case law connected to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act supports the
interpretation of child victims of prostitution as victims. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
repeatedly used the word "victim" to describe a 17-year-old who came to Guam to
144. See, e.g., Brandon, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 10 18-1024.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 129, 131.
147. See Roberson, 198 Cal.App.3d at 866-867.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (defining "victim" as one who is "directly and proximately harmed as a result of
the... offense").
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., U.S. v. Vaughn, CR. No. S-08-0052 LKK (GGH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86954, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008) ("Defendant Vaughn has been indicted for sex trafficking offenses involving
minors.... All of the alleged victims were stated to be under the age of eighteen at the time of the charged
offense, and there are a total of six victims."); cf, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758-60, nn.9-10 (1982)
(comparing child prostitution to child sexual pornography, and classifying the children in each case as "child
victim[s]").
151. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7 101(a) (2006).
152. Id. at (b)(6).
153. Id. at (b)(19).
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work as a prostitute.154 The Court concluded its discussion with the remark: "[A]s
to the age of the victim. . .[the defendant] in fact imported a minor for purposes of
prostitution."155  Likewise, in the case of other statutes directed at the sex
trafficking of children, courts have consistently described the child prostitutes as
"victims." 1 56 This is true even in cases where the child prostitutes allegedly acted of
their own volition in accepting payment for sexual acts. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has
described child prostitutes as victims, stating that the sex offender "hired the boys
to engage in sex acts with the promise of monetary payment" and describing the sex
acts engaged in by the boys for approximately two dollars as "commercial sex
acts."157 Despite the ostensibly commercial nature of the acts, the Court labeled the
boys as victims. 158
The principle that child victims of prostitution are victims has remained true
even when the child prostitute was held in detention (in custody). 159 Thus, for
example, a district court ordered that the custodian of juvenile records provide
"certified copies of any and all information pertaining to a victim in a child sex
trafficking case."1 60 Likewise, victims of child prostitution who later continue to
work in the sex industry are labeled as victims. For example, the Ninth Circuit
repeatedly used the term "victims" to describe a group of women who had been
tricked into coming to a United States territory for the purposes of prostitution,
notwithstanding the fact that the women later continued to work as prostitutes.161
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure refer to "any victim of a
crime of violence or sexual abuse."1 62 Prior to being superseded by the Crime
Victims Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure stated that a court
"must address any victim of a crime of violence or sexual abuse who is present at
sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any information about the
sentence."l63 Thus, federal law has long recognized individuals who have suffered
sexual abuse are "victims."
C. Potential weakness in the conflicts argument.
The above argument is certainly worth making, but it is subject to two
potentially significant lines of attack. First, if the right to be recognized as a victim
is not itself a right covered under the Conflicts provision (which instead only covers
those substantive rights that accrue to parties recognized as victims), then the
154. United States v. MiKyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cit. 2008).
155. Id. at 993-994.
156. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2008) ("Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion");
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cit. 2006) (interpreting this statute).
157. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103-1110.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., United States v. McClure, No. 08-cr-100 (WBS), No. 08-cr- 270 (WBS), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29247, at *10 (E.D. Cal. April 7, 2009)
160. Id. (internal citation omitted).
161. United States v. ChangDa Liu, No. 06-10758, 538 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).
162. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B).
163. Id.
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argument fails from the outset. There would be no conflict with any prior law.
Second, even if that issue is overcome, it is far from clear that there would be a
conflict requiring the application of Marsy's Law. If a prior law recognizes an in-
custody minor as a victim and Marsy's Law does not, the Conflicts provision can
simply be read to state that nothing in Marsy's Law is intended to undo the
protections of the existing law for those minor victims. That would do nothing to
secure them protection directly under Marsy's Law itself.
V. The narrow interpretation is sound from a policy perspective.
In interpreting ambiguous statutes, courts will consider principles of public
policy.164 The narrow interpretation of the exclusion sentence makes sense for two
policy reasons. First, it limits the burden on the state prison system.165 Second, it
prevents perpetrators of family crimes from attending hearings as "victims."1 66
A. Burden on state prison system
The 2008 version of Marsy's Law expands the definition of "victim" to include
family members of direct victims.167 Furthermore, the 2008 version grants
"victims" the right to be present and to participate in a wide variety of legal
proceedings, including: the right to be present at "all public proceedings.. at which
the defendant and the prosecutor are entitled to be present" and "all parole or other
post-conviction release proceedings;" 168 the right to be heard "at any proceeding,
including any delinquency proceeding, involving a post-arrest release decision,
plea, sentencing, post-conviction release decision, or any proceeding in which a
right of the victim is at issue;"l69 the right to "provide information to a probation
department official conducting a pre-sentence investigation;" and the right to
"participate in the parole process." 171 If all incarcerated derivative victims were
granted these additional rights, it would create an enormous burden upon the
California prison system.172 It is reasonable to restrict the scope of derivative
victims so that the prison system is not overwhelmed by prisoners attending
innumerable proceedings at government expense. The amendment reasonably
excludes persons "in custody" from being defined as "victims" merely as a result of
their family relationship to a direct victim.
164. . See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 583 (2008) (citing public policy arguments in
support of interpretation of statute); U.S. v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 718 (1990) (interpreting statute
in manner that conforms with the "great principle of public policy").
165. See infra Part V.A.
166. See infra Part V.B.
167. Marsy's Law, supra note 14, § 4.1.
168. Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(7).
169. Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(8).
170. Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(10).
171. Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(15).
172. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (finding that, in California, "[o]vercrowding has
overtaken the limited resources of prison staff').
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There is a legitimate public policy concern that extending "victim" status to all
incarcerated derivative victims of crime could overburden the prison system by
requiring the state to transport these individuals to proceedings on behalf of a
victim.173 However, this public policy rationale does not apply in the case of direct
victims, because in a typical case the direct victim would be expected to attend trial
proceedings as a witness anyway.
This interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the federal Crime
Victims Rights Act, which granted crime victims the right to be "reasonably heard
at any public proceeding."l74 Jon Kyl, a sponsor of the Crime Victims Rights Act,
explained that "the term 'reasonably' is meant to allow for alternative methods of
communicating a victim's views to the court when the victim is unable to attend the
proceedings. Such circumstances might arise, for example, if the victim is
incarcerated on unrelated matters at the time of the proceedings . . . ."175 As this
statement demonstrates, federal legislators made the public policy choice of not
transporting incarcerated victims to hearings for purposes of making a victim's
impact statement; it would hardly be surprising if state legislators made the same
choice.
B. Perpetrators offamily violence
Similarly, if there were no exclusion of persons "in custody for a crime" from
the category of derivative victims, then certain incarcerated perpetrators of family
violence would transform into "victims" due to their family relationship to the
direct victim. Consider the following hypothetical: A father is convicted and
incarcerated for sexually assaulting his 18-year-old daughter. Later, the daughter
becomes the victim of a separate, unrelated crime. The father would not be
considered "the accused" for purposes of the new crime. Likewise, the father
would not be a person incapable of acting in the best interests of a minor victim,
because the victim is not a minor. Thus, without the additional exception of "a
person in custody for an offense," the father would be transformed into a "victim"
solely due to his family relationship to the daughter. As a "victim," the father
would have the right to attend all proceedings involving his daughter - the victim of
his own sexual abuse. Perpetrators of other acts of family violence, such as
domestic violence, incest, or molestation, would each become transformed into
"victims" solely by virtue of their victim becoming victimized a second time while
an adult. A narrow interpretation of the "in custody for an offense" exclusion
would avoid this result.
However, this public policy exclusion does not make sense when applied to the
direct victim. The direct victim of family crimes is not the perpetrator, and she
does not need to be protected from herself.
173. See id.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006).
175. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
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VI. Proposed model language for future victims' rights amendments.
As discussed above, in the author's view the definitional section of Marsy's
Law is clear, and the alternative interpretation would create perverse results.
Nevertheless, to entirely avoid any potential ambiguities, the author recommends
that, to the extent that proponents of future victims' rights amendments wish to
build upon this language, those proponents improve the language so as to remove
any alleged ambiguities.
To be certain, many victims' rights amendments have been proposed, and
Marsy's Law is just one in a crowd.176 The earliest proposed amendment would
have simply added the following language to the Sixth Amendment: "Likewise, the
victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be
heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings."l77 In the current Congress, a
very different (and far lengthier) constitutional amendment is under
consideration.178 Nevertheless, should future victims' rights proponents wish to
emulate the California state constitutional amendment, with its relatively broad
recognition of derivative victims as "victims," the following slightly modified
language would eliminate the alleged ambiguities of Marsy's Law:
The term "victim" shall include both direct and indirect victims.
A direct victim is a person who suffers direct or threatened
physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the
commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act.
The term "victim" shall include all direct victims. An indirect
victim is a person who suffers derivatively from the commission
176. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 612-16
(2009) (outlining history of proposed national and state constitutional amendments).
177. Id. at 614.
178. H.R.J. Res. 106, 112th Cong. (2012). The text of the currently proposed constitutional amendment is
available at: Nat'l Victims' Const. Amendment Passage, http://www.nvcap.org/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012):
Section 1. The rights of a crime victim to fairness, respect, and dignity, being capable of
protection without denying the constitutional rights of the accused, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State. The crime victim shall, moreover, have the rights to
reasonable notice of, and shall not be excluded from, public proceedings relating to the offense,
to be heard at any release, plea, sentencing, or other such proceeding involving any right
established by this article, to proceedings free from unreasonable delay, to reasonable notice of
the release or escape of the accused, to due consideration of the crime victim's safety, and to
restitution. The crime victim or the crime victim's lawful representative has standing to fully
assert and enforce these rights in any court. Nothing in this article provides grounds for a new
trial or any claim for damages and no person accused of the conduct described in section 2 of
this article may obtain any form of relief.
Section 2. For purposes of this article, a crime victim includes any person against whom the
criminal offense is committed or who is directly harmed by the commission of an act, which, if
committed by a competent adult, would constitute a crime.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it has been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within 14 years after the
date of its submission to the States by the Congress. This article shall take effect on the 180th
day after the date of its ratification.
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or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act, including
the direct victim's spouse, parents, children, siblings, and
guardian. In the case of a direct victim who is deceased, a minor,
or physically or psychologically incapacitated, the category of
indirect victim shall also include a lawful representative. The term
"victim" shall include all indirect victims, except that the term
"victim" shall not include any indirect victim who is in custody for
an offense, who is accused of a crime, or a person whom the court
finds would not act in the best interests of a minor victim.
In the author's view, explicitly breaking down the concept of "victim" into its
component parts - "direct" victims and "derivative" or "indirect" victims - will
avoid both the purported ambiguities and perverse results described above.
